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THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION

1. The increase in size of the Hungarian Army is being carried on according to the universal service system. The period of service is currently two years, except in the armored force and air force, where it is three years. A certain percentage of the yearly conscript contingent gets only an eight to ten week reservist training. This group includes such persons in industry and management whose long absence would result in disadvantage to the state.
2. Conscription is in the hands of the four military district commands. They have reinforcement commands for the purpose. Reinforcement is nonterritorial; that is, recruits are sent to garrisons at some distance from their homes. This would hinder a rapid mobilization of reserves, but the system was installed at the desire of the Soviets because it makes it easier to watch the men.
3. Training takes place according to Soviet regulations, translated into Hungarian, and no variation from them is permitted. From Nov to the following Mar there is recruit training in garrison. From Mar to Oct there are training and exercises in a field training camp, the men living in tents. During this period training takes place in squads, companies and battalions. The first section of this training ends in Aug; after this there are divisional exercises, and exercises of the combined arms.
4. The training of active officers follows in officers' schools. Only those are accepted who successfully pass a "political cadre examination." Students in the officers' schools must have completed their regular service and applied on a volunteer basis.

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5. Subalterns take a two year course in one of the special schools; the political officers' school in Budapest, the infantry school in Pécs, the artillery school in Budapest, the armored school in Tata, the AAA school in Budapest. There are further courses for future battalion and regimental officers, which can be entered only after still closer political examination. Particular value is attached to the learning of Russian; until this language has been learned the candidate is not qualified to command any large unit. Higher training and the training of general staff officers takes place in the USSR, where there are also specialist courses, particularly for air and armored officers.
6. Even aside from training the whole organization of the Hungarian Army is under tight Soviet control. The Soviet liaison staff in the Hungarian Defense Ministry contains about 80 high officers, with a Lieutenant General at their head. In a practical sense this means that the Hungarian Army leadership does no planning of its own.
7. In addition there is a Soviet adviser at the headquarters of each division and independent regiment. He is a Soviet staff officer, who has a translator and a driver attached to him. This adviser has the same rights with regard to the troops as the Hungarian commander of the unit. He inspects formations, orders disciplinary measures and so on.
8. In promotions the ruling factors are, in order: first, political training and reliability; second, knowledge of Russian; third, military knowledge.
9. The peace strength of the Hungarian Army, without counting the air force or the AVH formations, is about 200,000 men. Active officers and NCOs, together with long service men, number 27,000 to 30,000. During the summer, the total figure is increased by 30,000 to 60,000 reservists called up for refresher training.
10. The yearly recruits available are 80,000 men, but in the last five years only 50,000 have been conscripted for training annually. This gives a reserve of 250,000 trained men as of early 1954, and makes a total of at least 450,000 well trained men available. In addition to the regular divisions, this would permit the organization of four or five more, provided equipment were available.
11. In spite of these figures the Hungarian Army can only be regarded as an auxiliary force. The percentage of armor is very low, there is no strategic air force, and the air support formations are shackled with antiquated equipment. The army could thus be of service only as part of a coalition, which is doubtless the objective of the directing Soviets.
12. The value of the troops can be doubted on grounds of morale. They receive a harsh and often brutal discipline, but the army has no tradition of its own, and has remained untouched by Soviet ideals. The individual soldier is very discontented with the regime in his private life. He is not prepared to make personal sacrifices or give his life for the Soviet system. Without the support of large Soviet forces, it is likely that the army would rapidly become demoralized under war conditions.

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